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Abstract 
 
Publications in leading journals are widely known to have a positive 
impact on economists’ judgments of the value of authors’ contributions 
and professional reputations. While conjectures that publications in 
lower-rated journals likely have a negative impact on such judgments 
are common, there have been virtually no direct tests of their validity.  
Our intent is to provide results from such a test, one that involved asking 
economists from 44 universities throughout the world to rate either a 
publication list with only higher-rated journals or a list with all of these 
but with additional publications in lower-rated journals. Our primary 
finding was that, holding other things constant, adding publications in 
lower-rated journals to what is typically considered a good publication 
record does have a significant negative impact on economists’ 
judgments of the value of the author’s contribution. Most implications 
of this bias suggest negative impacts on social welfare.   
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Judgments of individual economists’ contributions to the scientific literature, and their 
professional reputations, are heavily influenced by not just the number of publications, 
but the perceived quality of the journals in which their publications appear.  Such 
assessments of an individual’s publication list, and what they may imply about future 
productivity, play a varying, but usually an important, role in hiring, promotion, and 
tenure decisions, in not just research universities, but in many other institutions as well 
(Grimes and Register, 1997; Combes et al., 2008; Conley et al., 2011). They are also 
often instrumental in awarding research support, generating requests to offer their 
professional advice as consultants and as advisors to public bodies, and prompting 
invitations to take part in conferences, workshops, seminars, and the like – and it is rare 
that publication in “top five” journals is not mentioned in introductions when 
economists are invited to speak to their peers.  A consequence is the huge and growing 
demand of authors, especially those associated with academic institutions, to get their 
papers into top journals – the number of papers submitted to the top five journals more 
than doubled from 2,800 in 1990 to 5,800 in 2011 (Card and DellaVigna, 2013) with, 
for example, submissions to the American Economic Review have increased by 9 
percent in the recent years, reaching 1,929 submissions in 2017 (Goldberg, 2017). 
Individual faculty members’ publication records are also used in the 
construction of departmental rankings (see, e.g., Dusansky and Vernon, 1998; 
Kalaitzidakis et al., 2003), which are used to attract grants and prospective faculty 
members and students. Moreover, many universities and departments – especially ones 
with relatively less experience in making hiring and promotion decisions that are based 
on research accomplishments – regularly rely on journal ranks to provide not only 
validation of their decisions but evidence of a more “objective” standard for judging 
people, thereby reducing the criticisms of decisions.2
 
                                                             
2 There may also well be some instances of economist's reasoning similar to the one characterized by 
Hamermesh (2015a); “The reason why most academic economists judge their own and their peers’ 
achievements by numbers of publications in top journals is simple: the signals of achievement require 
very little effort in gathering information and necessitate almost no thought” Hamermesh (2015b), 
VoxEU, 14 December 2015. 
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While it is generally appreciated that the presence of well recognized and 
prestigious journals on a publication list has a very favourable impact on judgments of 
an author’s contributions and resulting reputation (see, e.g., Christenson and Sigelman, 
1985; Howard et al., 1987; Andersen, 2000; Baden-Fuller et al., 2000; Swidler and 
Goldreyer, 2002; Bouyssou and Marchant, 2011, for examples from different 
disciplines), much less is known and very little attention has been given to the impact 
of including publications in lower ranked journals.3 Although such publications may 
have substantial positive social value in disseminating useful innovations and empirical 
findings, a common feeling among economists’ judgements of their authors’ 
contributions is that additional publications in lower ranked journals have little or no 
positive impact on other economists’ judgments of contributions to the literature, and 
some have suggested that such publications may actually have a negative impact. There 
appears, however, to be very little, if any, direct empirical evidence to either support or 
discount such assertions, and the widely observed publications of well-respected 
economists in lower rated journals would seem to support a contrary view.  
The feelings that producing something having positive value, publications in 
this case, may not contribute much to a person’s reputation, and might even detract 
from it, arises at least in part from a form of focal illusion whereby people sometimes 
assess something having greater objective value as being worth less than a related good 
of objectively lesser value. For example, in one of a series of clear, and very helpful, 
empirical demonstrations, Christopher Hsee (1998), found that people shown a set of 
dinnerware having 24 pieces in good condition, were willing to pay significantly more 
for these than another group of people were willing to pay for a set they saw that 
contained 28 pieces in good condition but with another 11 that were broken. Clearly, 
even though valued less by the individuals in the two groups, by the more meaningful 
criteria of having more usable pieces the latter set was worth more – something that 
was only reflected in the valuations of a third group who were shown both sets. As 
suggested by Hsee, this “less-is-better” effect, which only occurs when options are 
evaluated separately, can be explained in terms of the evaluability hypothesis, which 
                                                             
3 One exception is the work by Grimes and Register (1997) who found, using a data of academic 
economists in year 1968, that publishing in low-ranked journals correlates negatively with job rank 
within the profession.  
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holds that separate evaluations of objects are often influenced by attributes which are 
easy to evaluate rather than by those which are important.   
Our study, which may well be the first of its kind that involves economists’ 
publication lists, provides a direct test of whether or not something of the same less-is-
better effect might also influence such evaluations. That is, might the inclusion of 
publications in well-known and respected, but lower ranked, journals along with those 
in higher ranked ones, either not add much positive impact on the assessments of other 
economists or even similar to that of the broken pieces of dinnerware in the Hsee study, 
have a negative impact? 
Our main finding from two tests, each involving two pairs of reading lists, was 
that in the judgments elicited from a total of 378 economists from 44 universities in 
nearly all regions of the world – many of whom holding senior appointments and would 
likely be in a position to exercise or influence hiring, promotion, tenure, and research 
grant award decisions – it appears likely that the inclusion of lower ranked journals on 
an individual’s publication list will have a negative impact on the assessment of such 
lists by other economists. We found statistically meaningful differences between the 
higher average rating that respondents gave to both lists having only eight higher ranked 
journals, and the lower average rating that other subsamples gave to lists containing all 
of the same eight higher ranked journals plus six more lower ranked ones.  
The implications of these, and other, findings from our study seem likely to 
extend beyond just the individual authors. To the extent that they adjust their research 
and publication strategies in line with the incentives which these judgments provide, 
institutions that rely, at least to some extent, on judgments of research quality to guide 
their activities and personnel decisions, journals that may see their submissions 
responding to these judgments, the wider community which both funds research and 
benefits from its findings are all also likely to be affected. Although the importance of 
these implications varies, they nearly all imply negative impacts on social welfare.4    
                                                             
4 To the best of our knowledge, there was one other study by Steven Hayes (1983) that looked at the 
trade-offs between quantity and quality of publications in the evaluation of academic vitae of 
psychologists, which found  results similar to those from our study. However, unlike ours, Hayes’s study 
did not involve any randomization of different treatments across psychologists, which means that we 
cannot infer causality from his study. Also, the field in Hayes’s study was psychology, and it is debatable 
whether his results can be generalized across different fields of study.  
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II. Survey Design and Procedures 
          
Our respondents were faculty members from research-led economic departments in 
universities located in different parts of the world. For each of these regions, we 
randomly selected economic departments that belong to the top 10% research based 
universities as listed in the Research Papers in Economics (RePEC) website: 
https://ideas.repec.org/top. As a main focus of our study was on UK and US 
universities, more than a proportionate share of data was collected in these two areas. 
In total, we have economists from 44 universities in our sample, with 14 universities in 
the UK, 12 in the US, 2 in Canada, 5 in Continental Europe, 1 in Hong Kong, 3 in 
Singapore, 6 in Australia, and 1 in New Zealand. These universities are reasonably well 
known in academic circles and many of their faculty members received PhD degrees 
from the world’s top ranked universities. Publications in internationally peer-reviewed 
economic journals would presumably be important for the appointment, promotion, and 
tenure decision process in all of these universities. 
In all, we sent 1,827 email invitations to take part in the survey to faculty 
members of these 44 universities, in which we provided a web link to the Google form 
page of our randomized survey. If they agreed to participate, they were then asked to 
proceed to the survey page by clicking the web link provided. In addition, we also 
invited current PhD students at 7 universities in the US, the UK, Australia and 
Singapore. There were in total 502 PhD students invited, with 52 completing the survey. 
Overall, we received 378 anonymous positive responses to our surveys, which 
represents around a 16% response rate.5  
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
                                                             
5 To many observers, the 16% response rate may seem small. However, it should be noted that we did 
not incentivize our colleagues to complete the survey, or send reminders when questionnaires were not 
completed. We relied completely on their willingness to volunteer a few minutes of their time to 
participate in the survey, with only the promise that we would send them the results later if they were 
interested in having them. It is therefore possible that our experimental results are only representative of 
those who are naturally more altruistic towards our cause without having to be incentivized to do so. 
However, we believe that our two-step recruitment process – our colleagues could have, if they wish, 
simply ignored our invitation to participate in the survey in the first stage – we believe that they would 
have completed the actual task seriously (which is in the second step) without the need to be incentivized. 
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Table 1 provides detailed summary statistics of characteristics of both the 
population sample of individuals invited to take part in the survey and those that did so. 
These show that the characteristics of the individuals replying positively to our 
invitation to take part, such as; the gender composition, the highest education 
attainment, the year of PhD completion, the country where the PhD degree is obtained, 
and the job title, fairly well mimic those of the population that was invited – including 
the gender imbalance among economists holding academic positions (for example, 
Kahn, 1993).6 
A total of seven individual survey treatments were used in our study. The first 
four provided the primary tests of the influence of lower ranked journals on economists’ 
judgments of publication lists – the main purpose of the study. Two provided a 
comparison of the ratings for lists containing six publications in top field and second-
tier general economics journals (Journal of Econometrics, Economic Journal,  Journal 
of Labor Economics, Journal of International Economics, Journal of Public 
Economics, and Review of Economics and Statistics) and two publications in “top five” 
journals (Quarterly Journal of Economics and Journal of Political Economy), but one 
list with and the other without the addition of publications in lower ranked journals 
(“Long Top 5” and “Short Top 5”, respectively). The lower ranked journals are selected 
based on different rankings of economics journals (e.g., Kalaitzidakis et al., 2003; 
Combes and Linnemer, 2010).7 The other two provided a similar comparison test of 
lists with and without inclusion of lower rated journals, but with both lists having no 
“top five” journals (“Long No Top 5” and “Short No Top 5”).  
 
(Table 2 and Table 3 about here) 
 
Two further treatments asked for ratings of the same lists when both pairs were 
evaluated together by respondents – joint valuation of “Short Top 5” and “Long Top 
5”, and joint valuation of “Short No Top 5” and “Long No Top 5”. The seventh 
treatment contained only lower ranked journals (“Long Lower Ranked”) and provided 
                                                             
6 See Appendix A for more detailed summary statistics, Appendix B for the distribution of survey 
responses, and Appendix C for the list of the sampled universities. 
7 We selected those low ranked journals that have contrasting difference in ranking with those top 5 
journals to ensure a sizeable magnitude of the treatment effect. If these low ranked journals are not 
sufficiently low, e.g. still within the top 10 or top 20 journals, we believe that the treatment effect 
would still be present, although the magnitude may not be that large. We relegate this for future 
research.  
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a confirmation test of the sensitivity of people’s judgments of the quality of publication 
lists to the rankings of the journals that are included. 
 
(Table 4 about here) 
 
For every university in our list, we randomly allocated their faculty members 
among the 7 experimental treatments. In particular, we provided 7 different Google 
form web links in the email invitation, with each bringing the respondents to the unique 
survey website for the respective treatment. We used a between-subject survey design 
which allowed each participant to participate in only one treatment. 
After examining the hypothetical CV publication list, they were randomly given 
(or two lists for those asked for joint valuations), respondents’ valuations of the 
publication lists were elicited with the following question:  
 
“Without any other information, rate individual A’s publications as 
contributions to the literature and individual A’s professional reputation 
on the following 10-point scale, where 1 = worst possible CV,…, 10 = best 
possible CV”. 
 
To further increase respondents’ focus on the journals in the lists as indicators of the 
value of the contributions, the instructions noted that the list did not include solicited 
or invited papers, or ones submitted to conferences. The responses are collected 
anonymously online using Google survey form.  
We deliberately did not give any clues or suggestions as to the career stage of 
the person our hypothetical CV belongs to, specifically because we did not wish to 
prime our subjects into evaluating the hypothetical lists based on some expected values 
that might be deemed appropriate for a certain career stage. We felt that this concern 
outweighed the worry that the short lists might be taken as a signal of a lack of career 
time to publish more papers, and therefore a possible partial alternative explanation for 
our results – a decision subsequently vindicated by the results from the joint valuations. 
If the higher valuations of the short lists were the result of giving a benefit of a doubt 
to a lack of career time being the reason for their shortness in the single valuations, it 
should also be the case that authors with fewer publications would be given the same 
benefit of a doubt in joint valuations. Our results were very much the opposite from this 
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-- neither of the lists were given any probable-early-career benefit when they were 
judged with the longer lists. It seems far more likely that it is the presence of the lower 
ranked journals that has led to the results we observe. 
 
III. Results 
          
As indicated in Figure 1, the means of the single valuation ratings of the five lists 
provide clear evidence of the ability of respondents to discriminate among the different 
lists with reasonable sensitivity to differing ratings of the journals on these individual 
lists. The two containing publications in Top 5 journals (the “Short Top 5” and the 
“Long Top 5”) were, quite reasonably, given the highest ratings. These were followed, 
but by statistically significant lower mean ratings, by the two lists which contained all 
of those in the higher rated lists, but with the two “Top 5” journals (The QJE and JPE) 
replaced by two middle-tier general journals, Economica and Economic Inquiry (the 
“Short No Top 5” and “Long No Top 5” lists). Not surprisingly, the lowest single 
valuation ratings, by a good margin, were given to the list included as a consistency 
check, that is comprised entirely of publications in unambiguously lower ranked 
journals (the “Long Lower Ranked” list). 
            
(Figure 1 about here) 
 
III.A. Impact of Lower Ranked Journals in Separate Comparisons 
         
The results summarized in Figure 1, provide the main answers to the central question 
addressed in the study – the impact of lower ranked journals on economists’ 
assessments of publication lists. In the judgments of the 378 economists completing our 
surveys, inclusion of lower ranked journals does have an impact on their judgments of 
the value of the research contribution of an individual:  it is negative, it is statistically 
significant, and it is meaningfully large. 
       In the first comparison test, one sub-sample of respondents was given only the 
single “Short Top 5” publication list to view and to rate on a 0 to 10 scale. Another sub-
sample of respondents was asked to do the same for the only list they saw, the “Long 
Top 5”. Again, and as is evident in comparing the two (Table 2), the longer list contains 
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all eight of the higher rated journals, including two of the “Top Five”, on the short list, 
but it has six others of lower rank included as well.  
       Respondents given the “Short Top 5” list, gave it an average rating of 8.1; those 
given the “Long Top 5” list provided ratings with a 7.6 mean. As indicated by a Mann-
Whitney nonparametric test, the difference is statistically meaningful (Table 5). 
 
(Table 5 about here) 
 
       A second, and similar, comparative test was provided by the ratings given to the 
“Short No Top 5” and “Long No Top 5” lists; ones that excluded any “Top Five” 
journals, but with the long list again including all eight of the journals on the short list, 
plus another six lower ranked ones. The mean rating given by respondents seeing only 
the “Short No Top 5” journal list was 7.0. The mean rating given by economists shown 
only the “Long No Top 5” list was 6.3. In this case as well, the Mann-Whitney test 
indicated a comfortable level of statistical significance between the two means (Table 
5). Here, as in the other comparison test, the average rating of the publication containing 
lower ranked journals was judged to be significantly less worthy than a publication list 
that differed only by not having such “lesser” publications added to ones in the other 
relatively higher ranked journals.8 
        While the tests of differences in the means of the ratings of individual 
publication lists, provides strong empirical evidence that inclusion of publications in 
lower ranked journals has a substantial negative impact on economists’ judgments of 
the research of the authors, there remains the possibility that this may be at least in part 
be due to confounding effects of other variables. To check for this, we conducted a 
series of further tests of the effects of various control variables on the conclusions 
reached on the basis of comparisons of the means of individual ratings of different 
publication lists.  
 
(Table 6 about here) 
 The results of regressions of respondents’ ratings on different Separate-
evaluation treatments using OLS in Columns 1 and 2, and ordered probit in Columns 3 
                                                             
8 This conclusion is further supported by the much lower mean rating of 3.2 given by respondents seeing 
only the “long lower ranked” journal list.   
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and 4, are reported in Table 6. Columns 1 and 3 include treatment dummies as the only 
independent variables, whilst Columns 2 and 4 control for respondent’s gender, 
academic positions (professor/associate professorship/assistant professorship/current 
PhD student), highest education level, dummies for year completed highest education 
level, and country where the highest level of education was obtained (US/UK/Rest of 
the World). The baseline for comparison is the “Short Top 5” publication list. 
With more control variables, we continue to find economists preferring shorter 
CVs to longer CVs when additional publications in the longer CVs appeared in lower-
ranked journals: the average rating of the long “Long Top 5” to be around 0.5-point 
lower than the average rating of the “Short Top 5” in the OLS regression, and this 
difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. The “Short no Top 5” receives an 
average rating that is around 1-point lower than the average rating obtained for “Short 
Top 5”, while the “Long no Top 5” has received around 1.8-point lower rating than the 
average rating of “Short Top 5”. As anticipated, the “Long lower-ranked journals” 
receives the lowest average rating across all CVs, with an average of nearly 5 points 
(out of 10-point scale) lower than the average rating received by “Short Top 5”. And as 
can be seen in Column 2, adding control variables to the regression does very little to 
change the magnitudes and the statistical significances of these estimates. In addition 
to this, we can see that the estimates obtained from running ordered probit models are 
remarkably similar to those obtained using OLS, thus suggesting that it makes virtually 
no difference whether one assumes cardinality or ordinality in the CV ratings.  
(Table 7 about here) 
How consistent are these findings across different sub-samples? The results of 
tests of this done by re-estimating the full specification using OLS on different 
subsamples that are separated by gender, academic positions, year completed highest 
education, and country where the highest education was completed, using “Short Top 
5” as the baseline, are reported in Table 7. Looking across columns, it is remarkable to 
see that the general pattern of monotonically decreasing in the CV ratings from “Short 
Top 5” to “Long lower-ranked journals” seems to hold for most of the subsamples. Of 
10 subsamples, 4 (females, full professors, completed education by 2010, and 
completed in the UK) report statistically significantly lower average ratings for “Long 
Top 5” compared to “Short Top 5”. And of 10 subsamples, only respondents who 
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completed their education from elsewhere other than US or UK report statistically the 
same ratings for “Short no Top 5” and “Short Top 5”. 
 
In sum, Tables 6 and 7 produce the same striking conclusion: on average, 
economists judge a publication list containing lower ranked journals as less worthy than 
a list that differed only by not having such “lesser” publications added to ones in 
relatively higher ranked journals. The results are robust to controlling for economists’ 
characteristics (e.g., gender, position, country where PhD was obtained, etc.), as well 
as across different sub-groups.     
  
III.B. Impact of Lower Ranked Journals in Joint Comparisons 
While the negative impact on valuations of the addition of publications in lower ranked 
journals to ones of higher rankings was clear when judgments were based on 
examinations of single, isolated publication lists, the results of similar judgments based 
on simultaneous examination of both lists were very different. As in the results of the 
tests on sets of dinnerware, and other pairs of items reported by Hsee (1988), the 
judgments made when our respondents could directly compare both lists, and could 
immediately see that the long list contained all of the journals in the short list, plus 
others in addition, the negative impact of the added journals being of lower rank did 
not materialize in either of our tests (Figure 2). 
(Figure 2 about here) 
In the first joint comparison test respondents were asked to imagine two 
individuals, A and B, with A having publications in the journals in the “Short Top 5” 
list, and B having publications in the journals in the “Long Top 5” list. Both the “Short” 
and the “Long” “Top 5” lists were shown to respondents to allow them to make direct 
side-by-side comparisons. In contrast to the significantly lower ratings given in the 
single comparisons, in this joint comparison there was no evidence of lower ranked 
journals added to the higher ones having any negative impact on the judgments of their 
worth. However, neither was there any indication, in this test, that they added positively 
to these judgments. The average rating of 8.03 given to the “Short Top 5” list is 
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essentially the same as the 7.93 mean rating of the “Long Top 5” list, with no 
meaningful statistical difference (Table 5). 
In the second joint valuation test, in which respondents were shown both the 
“Short No Top 5” and the “Long No Top 5” lists as being those of two hypothetical 
individuals, the means of their ratings were 6.53 and 6.94, respectively. In this test, in 
which respondents could see that the longer list with the lower ranked journals included 
also contained all of those in the short list, not only did they not give a negative weight 
to the lower ranked journals, but gave a significant positive value to their inclusion.   
The results of these two joint-evaluation tests strongly suggest that it may not 
be significantly harmful for economists to publish additional papers in lower-ranked 
journals as long as the evaluators can clearly see – from being able to evaluate multiple 
publication lists simultaneously -- that people with longer lists have everything that 
people with the shorter lists have.  
However, it also appears, on the basis of all of the results, that it is not so much 
that other economists see publications in lower ranked journals as having negative 
value, as when they see the two in joint valuations they clearly do not judge this to be 
the case. It seems to be more the case that factors, or characteristics that are taken into 
account differ between single and joint evaluations and that it is this that gives rise to 
the results we observe. This view of the results also seems more consistent with other 
findings from comparative studies of people’s single and joint valuations – such as 
Hsee’s dinnerware study (1998) noted earlier.  
Various reasons for the single vs. joint valuation disparities have been 
suggested. These include the observation that single-valuations commonly limit 
people’s ability to properly consider the impacts of relevant characteristics and prompt 
consideration of fewer, or totally irrelevant attributes, such as Hsee’s finding that 
people considered the irrelevant characteristic of size of a container as the main reason 
they were willing to pay more for a smaller serving of ice cream that overflowed a very 
small dish than they would pay for a larger serving that only partially filled a much 
larger dish (Hsee, 1998). In a somewhat similar way, people have been shown to find 
some attributes of a good or person easy to evaluate even in an independent single 
valuation and therefore these tend to dominate in such cases, whereas other 
characteristics which are hard to evaluate in single valuations, and therefore largely 
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ignored, may be easier to assess in joint valuations and become important 
considerations of outcomes in such cases – all, therefore leading to very different 
ratings in the differing circumstance (Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, and Bazerman, 
1999).  
(Table 8 about here) 
We introduce estimates from the joint-evaluation treatments in Table 8. We can 
see that the difference in the average ratings between “Short Top 5” and “Long Top 5” 
when both CVs are being evaluated jointly to be statistically insignificant in Columns 
1 and 2 (OLS) as well as in Columns 5 and 6 (ordered probit). On the other hand, 
respondents in the joint-evaluation treatment tend to rate “Long no Top 5” around 0.4-
point higher than “Short no Top 5” in the OLS regression. Qualitatively the same results 
can also be obtained using ordered probit in Columns 7 and 8. This is consistent with 
the conclusion shown in Figure 2.  
(Table 9 about here) 
Finally, Table 9 reports OLS estimates by subsample for the joint-evaluation 
treatments.9 While we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the average ratings between 
“Short Top 5” and “Long Top 5” are the same, we can nevertheless reject the same null 
hypothesis for “Short no Top 5” and “Long no Top 5” for the cohorts of our respondents 
who completed their highest education level after 2010 (i.e., the younger cohorts) and 
those who completed education outside the US and the UK. 
We can also reject the null at the 10% level that the average rating of “Short no 
Top 5” is statistically the same as the average rating of “Long no Top 5” when CVs are 
being evaluated jointly. However, we are not able to reject the null that the average 
ratings of “Short Top 5” and “Long Top 5” are the same in the joint evaluation 
treatment, which is consistent with Hsee’s (1998) “Less is Better” effect. 
IV. Implications of results and conclusions  
      There seems to be a wide consensus among most economists actively involved 
in research that publications in higher rated journals are the ones that really “count” for 
                                                             
9 We have too few observations by gender and academic positions to do subsample analysis for these 
groups. 
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not only having an influence on economics and policy, but for other things they care 
about, such as employment, promotion, tenure, research support, invitations to take part 
in professionally or financial rewarding activities, and recognition. Concerns over the 
apparent disproportionate attention to these particular publications have with little 
doubt been exacerbated in recent years by the growing explicitness of these benefits 
being known to be tied to individuals’ publication in such journals.  
     There is also a further growing impression that publications in lower rated 
journals may not add much, if anything, to other economists’ judgments of the author’s 
contributions and resulting impacts on reputations. The findings from the present study 
strongly suggest that these feelings that such publications will be seriously discounted 
are not only likely to be correct, but that reality may be even harsher in ascribing a 
negative value to these efforts. 
      As with Hsee’s demonstration that a higher value was accorded a larger set of 
intact dinnerware that also contained broken pieces only when it could be directly 
compared to the smaller set, our respondents too were quick not to give a lower rating 
to the publication lists containing publications in lower ranked journals when they could 
directly see in a side-by-side comparison that these were clearly in addition to all of the 
better publications of the shorter list. However, as the usual occasions calling for actual 
judgements of publication lists are ones in which people are called on to rate that of a 
single individual, it is the result of our main test, the single or separate evaluation 
treatments, that is most relevant – and, presumably, most worrying. There are, of 
course, occasions in which is it the results of joint valuations that will matter to final 
outcomes. Perhaps most easily imagined are comparisons between candidates for a 
position or honour – Candidate X vs. Candidate Y. But most others, such as those 
involving promotion, tenure, and selection of consultants and other experts, seem to be 
ones more likely to turn on results of single valuations. Further, even in cases of 
Candidates X and Y competition over a position, it is largely the results of single 
valuations that determine whether a person becomes a Candidate X or a Candidate Y.    
     There appear to be at least two major groupings of implications of our empirical 
finding of the likely often negative contribution of publications in lower rated journals 
to economists’ judgments of the contributions of their authors. The first is the socially 
perverse incentives it provides to individual researchers’ choice of research and 
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publication strategies. The other is the detrimental impacts on the social efficiency of 
the conduct of research and the dissemination of the results. 
      To the extent that individual economists are aware of the basis of economists’ 
contribution and reputational judgments, they can be expected to tailor their research 
and publication strategies to at least some degree accordingly.  Research projects will 
more likely tend to be selected less on the basis of interests and advantages of the 
researcher in successfully carrying out such research, and more on the basis of topics 
more likely to appeal to editors and referees for relatively higher ranked general interest 
journals. Research papers are also more likely to be more quickly filed away after more 
minimal efforts to access better journals, rather than redone for a more appreciative 
specialized field journal readership. Consequently, socially useful and important work 
to make papers suitable for lower ranked journals may well not be undertaken by 
authors who see little or no benefit to themselves from their doing so – an all too 
common case of journal publication incentives to authors leading to external costs to 
the wider community. Another related case is that of research leading to replication 
tests of earlier findings being seriously discouraged by the extreme reluctance of top 
journals to consider publishing them because of their not being sufficiently novel, in 
spite of such papers being essential to the proper development of the field.  
     Overall, the judgments of the value of the contributions of individual 
economists suggested by the findings of the present study are likely to compromise, 
rather than enhance, social efficiency and community welfare. 
      To the extent that these judgments motivate individuals to withhold socially 
valuable research findings from publications rather than risk having them detract from 
their professional reputations, others are denied the benefits yielded by resources that 
have been expended to obtain them.10 Topics pursued with an eye towards ranking of 
the intended journal publication may, but may well not, efficiently match research 
productivity with reader and community interests.  
      A consequence of these and other perversions in incentives induced by the way 
reputational and contribution judgments are made, as indicated in the findings from the 
                                                             
10 An example of such a case, but one in which the author too bears a, possibly substantial, cost, occurs 
when tenure-track junior faculty fail to pursue publication in lower ranked good journals after rejections 
from top ones, only to end up with little to show for their “probationary time” efforts.  
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present study, is that hiring and promotion committees and research granting bodies 
will receive somewhat distorted views of the social productivity of individuals. That 
this may well often occur receives some considerable credence from our finding that 
when people viewed both publication lists together, they valued the one with lower 
ranked publications included as high or higher, so that the pattern that our findings 
suggest is likely to occur in the world, may give an inaccurate view of the social value 
of the contributions of individuals. This can lead to distorted signals to committees and 
granting bodies, which, of course, can only undermine efficient allocations. 
        The heavier weighting of publications in higher ranked journals together with the 
discounting of lower ranked journals in judgments of individual economist’s 
contributions can also be expected to result in a far from socially optimal distribution 
of submissions across journals of differing rank – a bias likely made more serious by 
the known imperfections in the screening process that feeds the hope that a lesser 
quality manuscript might just “slip in”, and as the cost to the author is low and the 
payoff may be extremely high, it could easily be “worth a try”. Further evidence that 
submissions to higher ranked journals have increased disproportionately, and likely not 
just the result of the increase in the quantity of economics research being done in the 
world, is provided by the dramatic increase in the numbers of “associate”, “assistant”, 
and other such editors who have been appointed to handle the larger volumes of their 
submissions – as a typical example, The American Economic Review now has an Editor, 
and nine no doubt needed (and no doubt over-employed) “Co-Editors”. 
       The resulting reduction in acceptance rates for higher rated journals brought about 
by their burgeoning submission numbers, seems likely to have two further 
consequences. The lower rate of acceptances may encourage ever more institutions to 
adopt some form of top journal publication as a screen for employment and promotion, 
as such success over ever longer odds may well be taken as an ever stronger signal of 
an individual’s productivity. However, falling acceptance rates for higher ranked 
journals make it more difficult for all to gain their acceptances, which seems likely to 
encouraging some, or possibly many, to submit their work to somewhat lower rated 
publications, thereby likely widening the array of journals that may be deemed as 
“acceptable” in providing admissible evidence of satisfactory productivity.  
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      A potentially interesting issue that our design of posing publication lists of 
hypothetical economists does not allow us to  properly test is the possibly different 
judgment of the impact of publications in lower ranked journals by more well-known 
and respected economists – which, as noted, may be one consequence of current trends. 
Would, for example, Adam Smith’s reputation have been harmed in any important way 
if the opportunity had been available to him and he had published a paper (or papers) 
in the equivalent of the North Borneo Rubber Planters Gazette? Another potentially 
interesting issue is whether high citation counts of papers published in lower ranked 
journals can compensate for their perceived lower ranking. 
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Gender     
Male  319 84.4% 1807 77.6% 
Female 59 15.6% 522 22.4% 
     
Education     
PhD 329 87.0% 1817 78.0% 
Masters 49 13.0% 507 21.8% 
Others   3 0.1% 
Missing information   2 0.1% 
     
Year completed PhD (faculty members only)   
Before 1991 64 19.5% 317 17.3% 
1991-2000 60 18.2% 259 14.2% 
2001-2010 110 33.4% 525 28.7% 
2011 and beyond 89 27.1% 319 17.5% 
Without PhD 0 0.0% 8 0.4% 
Missing information 6 1.8% 400 21.9% 
Country where the PhD is obtained (faculty members only)    
US 159 48.3% 955 52.2% 
UK 88 26.7% 307 16.8% 
Rest of the World 82 24.9% 425 23.2% 
Missing information   400 21.9% 
Job title     
Professor 140 37.0% 769 33.0% 
Associate      
Professor/Reader/Senior  
lecturer 62 16.4% 304 13.1% 
Assistant         
Professor/lecturer/researc
h fellow 124 32.8% 739 31.7% 
PhD Student 52 13.8% 501 21.5% 




Table 2: The Short “Top 5” Higher Ranked Journals and the Long “Top 5” with 
Lower Ranked Journals Added. 
 
A) The Short "Top 5" Higher Ranked Journals 
1. Journal of Econometrics 
2. Quarterly Journal of Economics 
3. Economic Journal 
4. Journal of Labor Economics 
5. Journal of International Economics 
6. Journal of Public Economics 
7. Review of Economics and Statistics 
8. Journal of Political Economy 
B) The Long "Top 5" Higher Ranked Journals 
1. Journal of Econometrics 
2. Journal of African Economics 
3. Quarterly Journal of Economics 
4. Economic Journal 
5. Pakistan Development Review 
6. Journal of Labor Economics 
7. Asian Economic Journal 
8. Journal of International Economics 
9. European Journal of Comparative Economics 
10. Pacific Economic Bulletin  
11. Journal of Public Economics 
12. Review of Economic and Statistics 
13. Journal of Political Economy 






Table 3: The Short “no Top 5” Higher Ranked Journals and the Long “no Top 5” 
with Lower Ranked Journals Added. 
A) The Short "no Top 5" Higher Ranked Journals 
1. Economica 
2. Journal of Econometrics 
3. Economic Journal 
4. Journal of Labor Economics 
5. Journal of International Economics 
6. Journal of Public Economics 
7. Review of Economics and Statistics 
8. Economic Inquiry 
B) The Long "no Top 5" Higher Ranked Journals 
1. Journal of Econometrics 
2. Journal of African Economics 
3. Economica 
4. Economic Journal 
5. Pakistan Development Review 
6. Journal of Labor Economics 
7. Asian Economic Journal 
8. Journal of International Economics 
9. European Journal of Comparative Economics 
10. Pacific Economic Bulletin  
11. Journal of Public Economics 
12. Review of Economic and Statistics 
13. Economic Inquiry 
14. South African Journal of Economics 
 
 
Table 4: the long “lower-ranked journals” CV (CV5) 
 
1. German Economic Review 
2. Journal of African Economics 
3. Emerging Market Review 
4. Empirical Economics 
5. Pakistan Development Review 
6. Eastern Economic Journal 
7. Asian Economic Journal 
8. Journal of Economic Methodology 
9. European Journal of Comparative Economics 
10. Pacific Economic Bulletin  
11. Global Economic Journal  
12. International Journal of the Economics of Business 
13. Applied Financial Economics 
14. South African Journal of Economics 
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Figure 1: Ratings of different hypothetical CVs, Separate-evaluation treatments  
 































Table 5: Two-sample Wilcox rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test of equal means 
  p-value 
1) Separate-evaluation treatments  
Short Top 5 vs. Long Top 5 0.0101 
Short Top 5 vs. Long no Top 5 0.0057 
Short Top 5 vs. Long lower-ranked journals 0.0000 
Short Top 5 vs. Short no Top 5 0.0000 
Long Top 5 vs. Short no top 5 0.0000 
  
2) Joint-evaluation treatments  
Short Top 5 vs. Long Top 5 0.5557 
Short no Top 5 vs. Long no Top 5 0.0783 
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Table 6: OLS and ordered probit regressions on ratings of different hypothetical 
CVs: Separate-evaluation treatments 
  OLS     OPROBIT 
VARIABLES (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Hypothetical CV treatments           
Long Top 5  -0.495** -0.491**  -0.557** -0.571** 
 [0.232] [0.229]  [0.235] [0.234] 
Short no Top 5 -1.098*** -1.058***  -1.260*** -1.235*** 
 [0.193] [0.187]  [0.211] [0.205] 
Long no Top 5 -1.771*** -1.751***  -1.770*** -1.815*** 
 [0.234] [0.235]  [0.234] [0.237] 
Long lower-ranked journals -4.853*** -4.856***  -3.698*** -3.830*** 
 [0.258] [0.242]  [0.324] [0.310] 
Respondent’s characteristics      
Associate Professor/Reader/Senior lecturer  -0.028   -0.036 
  [0.251]   [0.212] 
Assistant Professor/Lecturer/Research fellow  0.229   0.314 
  [0.282]   [0.257] 
Current PhD students  0.307   0.216 
  [0.848]   [0.627] 
Highest education: Master level  0.433   0.527 
  [0.789]   [0.574] 
Year completed highest education: 1991-2000  0.175   0.045 
  [0.285]   [0.238] 
Year completed highest education: 2001-2010  -0.103   -0.209 
  [0.293]   [0.237] 
Year completed highest education: post-2010  -0.078   -0.289 
  [0.375]   [0.326] 
Missing information on year completed education  -0.385   -0.354 
  [1.227]   [1.044] 
Male  -0.248   -0.227 
  [0.200]   [0.174] 
Country of highest education: UK  0.168   0.158 
  [0.179]   [0.155] 
Country of highest education: Rest of the World  0.188   0.204 
  [0.185]   [0.172] 
Constant 8.098*** 8.036***    
 [0.147] [0.279]    
Cut points      
C1    -5.437*** -5.684*** 
    [0.437] [0.463] 
C2    -4.025*** -4.193*** 
    [0.322] [0.372] 
C3    -3.295*** -3.421*** 
    [0.280] [0.333] 
C4    -2.819*** -2.914*** 
    [0.276] [0.318] 
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C5    -2.440*** -2.526*** 
    [0.251] [0.306] 
C6    -1.822*** -1.891*** 
    [0.214] [0.287] 
C7    -0.919*** -0.967*** 
    [0.179] [0.267] 
C8    0.456*** 0.446* 
    [0.159] [0.255] 
C9    1.668*** 1.720*** 
    [0.237] [0.300] 
Observations 271 271   271 271 
R-squared 0.649 0.670    
Pseudo R-squared       0.224 0.238 
 
Note: *<10%; **<5%; ***<1%. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 7: OLS regression on ratings of different hypothetical CVs by sub-sample: Separate-evaluation treatments 

























Hypothetical CV treatments           
Long Top 5  -1.076** -0.365 -0.898** -0.843 0.592 -1.075** -0.238 -0.391 -0.867** 0.232 
 [0.484] [0.252] [0.377] [0.582] [0.431] [0.407] [0.276] [0.372] [0.340] [0.483] 
Short no Top 5 -1.645*** -0.977*** -1.242*** -1.587*** -0.802** -1.193*** -1.061*** -0.877*** -1.304*** -0.595 
 [0.563] [0.210] [0.322] [0.452] [0.336] [0.371] [0.222] [0.259] [0.304] [0.602] 
Long no Top 5 -2.260*** -1.605*** -2.244*** -2.444*** -1.184*** -2.311*** -1.546*** -2.229*** -1.335*** -1.366** 
 [0.461] [0.272] [0.412] [0.762] [0.372] [0.468] [0.259] [0.427] [0.369] [0.538] 
Long lower-ranked journals -4.883*** -4.832*** -5.433*** -6.086*** -4.952*** -5.227*** -4.794*** -5.149*** -4.401*** -4.694*** 
 [0.605] [0.267] [0.334] [0.543] [0.367] [0.371] [0.312] [0.319] [0.467] [0.564] 
Observations 45 226 97 41 88 90 177 115 90 66 
R-squared 0.786 0.673 0.714 0.739 0.762 0.654 0.710 0.707 0.686 0.735 
 
Note: *<10%; **<5%; ***<1%. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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Figure 2: Ratings of different hypothetical CVs, joint-evaluation treatments 
 



























Table 8: OLS and ordered probit regressions on ratings of different hypothetical CVs: joint-evaluation treatments 
   OLS    OPROBIT  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Base: Short Top 5                  
Long Top 5 -0.103 -0.103    -0.081 -0.096   
 [0.148] [0.154]    [0.131] [0.153]   
Base: Short no Top 5          
Long no Top 5   0.408** 0.408**    0.352** 0.459** 
   [0.160] [0.169]    [0.151] [0.200] 
Associate Professor/Reader/Senior lecturer  0.872**  0.406   1.012***  0.454 
  [0.347]  [0.425]   [0.360]  [0.443] 
Assistant Professor/Lecturer/Research fellow  0.906**  0.471   0.955**  0.569 
  [0.390]  [0.590]   [0.431]  [0.622] 
Current PhD students  1.364*  -0.328   1.233  -0.350 
  [0.699]  [0.484]   [0.785]  [0.573] 
Year completed highest education: 1991-2000  -0.203  0.259   -0.306  0.349 
  [0.479]  [0.488]   [0.481]  [0.534] 
Year completed highest education: 2001-2010  -0.739  0.212   -0.941*  0.300 
  [0.470]  [0.623]   [0.502]  [0.665] 
Year completed highest education: post-2010  -1.414**  -0.229   -1.555**  -0.225 
  [0.569]  [0.718]   [0.653]  [0.770] 
Male  -0.048  -0.524   -0.283  -0.606 
  [0.793]  [0.347]   [0.849]  [0.379] 
Country of highest education: UK  0.023  0.675**   0.050  0.756** 
  [0.345]  [0.308]   [0.320]  [0.342] 
Country of highest education: Rest of the World  0.932***  0.743**   1.155***  0.825** 
  [0.345]  [0.294]   [0.427]  [0.349] 
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Constant 8.034*** 8.115*** 6.531*** 6.095***      
 [0.148] [0.903] [0.153] [0.518]      
Cut points          
C1      -1.757*** -2.356** -2.147*** -2.121*** 
      [0.238] [0.943] [0.361] [0.685] 
C2      -1.525*** -2.118** -0.824*** -0.509 
      [0.219] [0.988] [0.162] [0.562] 
C3      -0.464*** -0.935 -0.037 0.466 
      [0.162] [0.991] [0.156] [0.580] 
C4      0.267* -0.057 0.813*** 1.561** 
      [0.158] [1.000] [0.178] [0.622] 
C5      1.589*** 1.593 1.841*** 2.947*** 
      [0.249] [1.082] [0.234] [0.667] 
C6        2.548*** 4.105*** 
        [0.390] [0.711] 
Observations 116 116 98 98  116 116 98 98 
R-squared 0.002 0.229 0.031 0.389          
Pseudo R-squared       0.001 0.010   0.009  0.158 
 
Note: *<10%; **<5%; ***<1%. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Panel A: Joint-evaluation treatment 1      
Base: Short Top 5      
Long Top 5 -0.095 -0.108 0.069 -0.526 0.200 
 [0.275] [0.189] [0.214] [0.305] [0.291] 
Observations 42 74 58 38 20 
R-squared 0.196 0.415 0.264 0.158 0.113 
Panel B: Joint-evaluation treatment 2      
Base: Short no Top 5      
Long no Top 5 0.286 0.394** 0.211 0.538 0.529* 
 [0.393] [0.186] [0.280] [0.403] [0.265] 
Observations 28 66 38 26 34 
R-squared 0.367 0.325 0.211 0.469 0.205 
 
Note: *<10%; **<5%; ***<1%. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
